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1. Introduction: subject and problem definition
This study deals with the subject of distribution and re-distribution of actual')
steering and adjusting activities among single basic police units on the one
hand and steering and adjusting levels or centers in their (inter)organizational
environments on the other. I wanted to know if indeed such a "re-distribution"
could be observed, and if this would bring the Dutch police on the way
towards a more "modular organization". By this I mean a large-scale (and so
by definition at least centralized on main lines) organization, composed out of
relatively autonomous but result-responsible units ("modules"), which are
(within a global policy framework) predominantly controlled by means of
management-contracts and work-evaluations based on relevant monitor-
information.
2. Theory
The tendency towards more global central control and more autonomy of (sub)
units does not only exist in private enterprises, but also in public
administration and public organizations. In the sixties and seventies the aim
was mainly to motivate the organizational units and their members, and to
increase the involvement of the work teams at the base of the large
organizations (Kastelein, 1990 and 1993). One hoped to improve their
productivity and satisfaction by giving them better feedback and thereby
reducing their ahenation from the common endeavour. This "participation
motive" was reinforced by the cultural wave of democratization and self-
estimation, which later on ebbed away rather quickly (Kastelein, 1990). In the
eighties another motive became prominent, namely that of the controllability
of the organization as a whole in combination with "the fine tuning" of the
various front units to their specific environments.
Five formal-rational arguments for centralization and central control can be
distinguished:
- an external "more general" or "higher" interest, imposed from the outside
on the units concerned;
- a demand for equal rights, existing outside and/or within the units
concerned ("equal strikes for equal folks");
- the combining of means, power or influence ("stronger together");
- economy of scale ("cheaper by the dozen");
- the desirability of standardization, uniformization or compatiblity (derived
from one or more of the motives mentioned above).
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The question of whether, to which extent and in what way there really should
be any central control, should be answered by weighting on the one side the
required material and moral constraints and costs against the values gained on
the other. In doing this, five categories of factors restricting the effectiveness
ofcenfral steering, regulation and support ofperipheral units should be taken
into consideration:
- the scale of the field upon which central control is or should be exercised
(number and size of the units concerned);
- ttre diversity of the units concerned (differences in number and size of the
units concerned);
- the dynamics in the fields concerned (variation-range and variability of the
variables to be controlled):
- the interdependencies within the fields concerned (mutual dependence of
the variables to be controlled);
- the assertivity of the groups and/or persons within these units.
The stronger one or more of these factors arise, the higher the costs of central
control probably will be, and the more the likelihood of both a control-echec
for the central organs and ofalienating groups and persons subordinated to this
central control. These considerations are important since a large part of the
internal affairs of (sub)units mostly are externally determined by many aspect-
oriented centers. Thus the actual material control stucture is different from the
simple, formal hierarchical one. This way of control is called: "multi-central
aspect specification (MCA)". In MCA environments the internal processes (the
"throughputs") of the smaller units are not only specified by the traditional
line-officials but also by a manifold of external specialized aspect-controlling,
-coordinating, -supporting and supplying centres. Not recognizing this kind of
(functional) control structures is supposed to be one of the main causes of the
failure of many decentralization and autonomization projects.
A different means of control is both conceivable and feasible: one in which
central steering and regulation is limited to some strategic mainlines and the
above indicated aspect-oriented steering, regulation and support of the
(sub)units by external centers is replaced by input-output steering and
regulation, based upon self-management, contracts and (semi)market
relationships between the units (the above mentioned centers being transformed
into client-oriented service-providers).
A necessary provision for this system is dedicated monitor systems: the units
need reliable and timely information, relevant to their steering and regulation
needs. These "dashboards" also have another function, namely as information
source for the external accounts concerning the contracts.
Another kind of provision is the possiblity of "arbitration" in case of conflicts
about the contracts. In some cases this system also requires provisions for
"certification" of those external interests where some insight into the "black
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Such an alternative organizational system is called: "contractual multi-
organization" (cMo). All existing control structures in empiric reality can be
positioned on a line between both these extreme ideal types MCA-CMO.
There are several requirements for a successful transformation from MCA to
CMO. As already indicated: one of the failure factors is that the multi-central
aspect specifying character of the initial situation is not recognized. Each
"aspect specifying" center sLands for a particular interest and will not be
decharged by the simple decision to decentralize.
Another failure factor is the lack of awareness concerning the structural and
instrumental provisions that are minimally required for the desired situation to
really work. To realize the required provisions such as contracts, monitor
systems, arbitration and certification, some qualitative and quantitative
expertise is needed.
Last but not least there are two other failure factors, both in the field of
motivation. There is often an unspoken "zero-sum assumption" at all levels
of organization: the distribution of influence can be changed, but the total
amount of influence exercised in the (inter)organization, as a whole, remains
the same. However, the neryield of an extensive MCA-network is very low
and, in principle, the total amount of effective influence in a CMO-situation
will increase: a "win-win assumption". The "zero-sum assumption" does not
motivate and in many cases works as an inhibition or an impediment to the
desired change (Kastelein, 1990).
The transformation from MCA into CMO depends greatly on the motivation
of the members of the organization. On the central level, this motivation is
mostly derived from the awareness and recognition of the "control-echec" of
the MCA-practice and the frustrations caused by it.
On the lower decentral evels, motivation can be derived from a resistance to
the alienation, stemming from the MCA-system, and the resulting demand for
more involvement and autonomy. Both kinds of motives complete each other.
To summarize the necessary motivation-conditions ("process conditions ") :
1. a predominant part of the members of the organization must recognize the
MCA- character of the existing situation (instead of simply thinking in
terms of "centralization");
2. a predominant part of the members of the organization must have an
awareness of the CMO-provisions that are required to make the desired
situation really work (instead of only thinking in terms of a simple
hierarchical " decentr alization" as a solution) ;
3. a certain extra (instrumental as well as change process) expertise for
realizing these particular provisions (monitor systems, contracting,
certification and arbitration) should be available;
4. on the central levels as well as at the base of the inter-orsanization there
must be a decisive:
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- doubt on the zero-sum assumption: no a priori exclusion of a win-win
outcome:
- motiviation for change, stemming from the above indicated sources.
once a cMo-organization is started, it requires the material implementation
of the provisions ("system-conditions") meant under 2 (above):
l. suitable management- and support-contracts;
2. dedicated monitor-systems;
3. provisions for arbitration and sometimes for certification;
4. significant interest for the units involved to at least fulfil the contracts and
to increase their performance;
5. absence of frequent line-interventions;
6. absence of forced trade with support centers;
7. provisions for performance-incentives, absence of "punishment,' in the
form of budget-cutting for successful units.
Main hypotheses derived from this theory are:
1. A specific fit between a unit's system and its contingencies (qualitative and
quantitative workload, resources and constraints) will be connected with
predominantly positive judgements of internal and external stakeholders
about the effectiveness of this sub unit;
2. (Sub)units within "multi<enfial aspect specirying (inter)organizations" will
have more difficulties in finding and establishing their optimal fit,
regarding their particular internal and external contingencies, than "result-
responsible units" within "contractual multi-organizations". These result-
responsible units will more easily find their optimal fit.
3. (Sub)unis within "multi-central aspect specifuing interorganizations" will
gain less positive judgements about their effectiveness than units within
"contractual multi-organizations".
4. A successful change along the MCA-cMo line requires the presence of the
motivation as well as the (instrumental, structural) system-conditions which
are summarized above.
3. Research
My field research was carried out in ttre period 1990-1996, aiming at empirical
indications -and if possible evidence- that the phenomena described in this
theory occurred in the Dutch police. The following stages can be
distinguished:
- Three orienting investigations, in order to select a number of units that
were probably significantly contrasting in respect to "autonomy" (there
already had taken place, spread over the country, some
decentral ization/autonomization programs) :
- 15 interviews with chief commissioners of municipal police forces and
8 interviews with district commanders of the state police;
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- a connected interview program.
- Four comparitive case-studies (extensive management and organization
audits by means of a standardized program): two in municipal units, two
in state police units.
- Participant observations, connected interviews and document studies in the
steering committees of three police forces, charged with the task to initiate
and steer organizational reform projects.
- Participant observations, interviews and document studies in the project
organization that designed a new regional police force, as a merger of a
number of municipal forces and state police units.
- Inquiry, interview program and document study concerning a
decentralization program in a newly formed regional police force.
- Updating of earlier acquired material by interviews, document studies and
participant observations.
A complication during the course of the field research was that within one or
two years from the beginning the developments concerning organization and
control of the Dutch police came quite rapidly into operation. The 148
municipal police forces and 17 state police districts merged into 25 regional
forces and 1 national supporting force.
As a result the original research design, aimed at a transversal comparison of
a rather large number of units, more or less contrasting with respect to their
position on the autonomy-dimension had to be left for a more dynamic,
process observing approach.
As a consequence the original hypotheses{esting ambition was replaced by a
more humble, explorative and plausibility-seeking attitude.
4. Main conclusions
Concerning the question whether or not in the Dutch police units can be
observed in different positions (and in movements between these positions)
between MCA- and CMO-environments, my conclusions can be summarized
as follows:
Before "the great national police-merging process" (mentioned in former
paragraph) there has already occurred here and there more or less fundamental
decentralization-projects, but in the first two research stages actual empirical
changes could not yet be observed. During the following research stages,
focussed on the reform processes and on the organization re-design and
implementation programs, it became however evident that indeed significant
and effective material progress was made in fitting up the new regional forces,
according to the theoretically required provisions to let them function on the
basis of contractual steering and result-responsibility. There are strong
indications that a considerable transfer of steering and adjusting functions now
really is going down to the shop-floor and that this process will not stop




Concerning the question if there are empirical indications that units which
show the theoretically foreseen characteristics of "result-responsible units in
a CMO-environment" really show:
a. a better f it to their work-load and their working-conditions, and
b. a higher degree of effectiveness
than those that are more similar to "dependent units in an MCA-environment",
I have come to the followins conclusions:
l . As already mentioned, in the intended comparison at the beginning of my
investigations ( tage 1 and2) empiric variations (contrast) with respect o
"autonomy" hardly did exist. So this question could not be answered (and
even if the contrast would have been there, the nunber of cases (n : 4)
would have been too small).
During the later stages of the research the so called "process-conditions",
required for a significant move lrom MCA towards CMO, generally turned
out to be fulfil led).
Implementing the so called "system conditions" was explicitly part of the airns
of the rnentioned organization reform and re-design projects and programs,
which I investigated in the stages 3 and further. As far as my observarions
reach (in 5 regional forces, in a time span in which not all the projects reached
their deadlines and effects could not yet be evaiuated), I have to conclude that
in this respect a considerable progress is made in the direction of a "modular
organization". More and more "management contracting" and "result
accounting", based upon suited monitor provisions (the now so called "five-
plus instrumentary") are becoming normal practice . The policy-decision is
now to implement within a couple of years this instrumentary in all the Dutch
fbrces.
Although we undoubtedly have to conclude that there are significant changes
in the Dutch police on the MCA-CMO dimension, I am unable to answer the
question concerning the theoretically crucial role and contribution of the
"process-" and "system-cor-rdit ions", because I was unable to systematically
compare situations (or processes) in which these conditions were not and in
wl-rich these conditions were indeed Íulf i l led.
So summarizing I conclude that in the Dutch police the "modular
organization", as mentioned inparagraph 2, is indeed progressing. But I have
no evidence that units, operating under the new conditions are more effective
than those under the former regime. It is however my opinion, beyond the
scientif ic bearing surface but shared by many a police official, that they
actual ly  are more ef fect ive.
NOTE
') l.e. empirically perceptible, rnstead offi)nnallv designed.
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